Rape Jokes, Free Speech, and Inclusion

My train of thought on freedom of speech inspired by the unpleasant rape jokes in family Guy:

Dialogue:

A: rape jokes are wrong, you shouldn't make them. On top of that, they're not even funny.

B: sure, they're funny. Who are you to decide what's funny and what's not for everyone? And likewise, who are you to decide what's right and what's wrong (for everyone). I don't think they're wrong; I think they're fine.

A: fine, maybe I can't prove that they are wrong or not funny across the board, and maybe you're right that they are not wrong. But regardless of whether they are ultimately right or wrong, they still means that sexual assault survivors/victims and others sensitive to the issue will avoid your show. In essence then, the inclusion of rape jokes in your show is a method/means excluding sexual assault victims/survivors. That what you want?

Diversity, the Marketplace of Ideas, and Identity Politics

The value of diversity is in enhancing the marketplace of ideas and proliferating new content in it, not merely new types of participants. Under this interpretation of the value of diversity, ideological diversity is obviously just as desirable as ethnic diversity, or even more so.

This (that the value of diversity is in the new content that it includes/makes accessible) means that while traditionally/historically/largely excluded/marginalized/oppressed peoples' views should be made sure to be included, decisions on still being made on the merits of the arguments raised, including their's, and their views should not automatically be deferred to.

Colorblindness in Action and Policy

I can’t help but view colorblindness as the ideal.  

This does not mean that I favor instituting colorblindness right now, either in policy or my personal actions (although I do think the standard for overriding the presumption of colorblindness in my personal actions is/should be/is and should be higher than that in policy).  

Any questions about the effectiveness of affirmative action in redressing/rectifying institutional/structural racism, I would oppose ending affirmative action on the grounds of colorblindness.  

I support slavery reparations (again, everything else being equal and thus strategic and priority considerations aside).

I don’t think having double standards for the establishment of black groups and spaces and white groups and spaces is wrong or racist or even really inconsistent.  The same goes for such cases that arise in our individual lives, like the use of language like insults, stereotypes and racial jokes.

Why I have these views and their rightness is best demonstrated, I think, with the example of slavery reparations.

I support reparations as restitution for harm done.  The fact that we recognize and grant intergenerational property rights through inheritance law makes the case for reparations almost incontestable.  The labor and wealth stolen from slaves should be paid back to their ancestors just as much as inheritance should be passed down to make the victims of slavery whole again.   

But the injury of slavery is more than just the value stolen from slaves.  Like restitution in almost any case involves not only the victim being made whole again, it also involves compensation for pain and suffering, the magnitude of which in the case of slavery must surely imply an immense level of compensation.  To those who may grant that reparations ought to made for the value of stolen labor, but contest that it ought to include compensation for the pain and suffering of slaves since it is being paid not to those who endured it but their descendants, there are two responses*: first, the descendants also experience pain and suffering derived from the same original crime of slavery and, second, had the sums for compensation for pain and suffering been paid to the victims of the original generation, the slaves, their descendants would have received it in some form anyway.  

So current generation’s descendants should receive, in addition to the value of unpaid labor of slaves plus interest accrued, reparations must also include the difference in value between the wages earned by the non-slave descendants and the wages they would have earned if not subject to disadvantaged participation the US labor market due to their starting point without accumulated financial capital, and their unequal treatment in society at large, plus interest.  Some measure of compensation must also be included for their deficit of other types of capital, cultural, social, etc.  

And even this does not fully answer the question, since only the crime of slavery has been addressed, and not the subsequent crimes of Jim Crow, segregation, and more.

   

But this particular view in support of reparations accords with my holding colorblindness as the ideal (and with the reasoning of the US Supreme Court that it is legitimate for the state to interfere with and prohibit private discrimination because it is still a delayed result of original government policy; “badges of inferiority”) in that I am justifying non-colorblind policy and action on the grounds that it is to reverse the effects of earlier non-colorblind action that was harmful; i.e., to the extent that today’s poverty and marginalization of black people is the result of slavery, government can combat it with non-colorblind policy.  The end of slavery in the law does not mean that the harm from it is over if its effects persists over generations.

All this is to say that I still can’t help but hold racial colorblindness as the ideal, a la MLK’s quote about “not color of skin but content of character” that is so often naively invoked by those who oppose racial justice, and that such an ideal is still compatible with, nay still even obligates reparations, affirmative action, and more non-colorblind and progressive policy.

As for how to implement this ideal then given all these conditions I’ve laid out?  One might say that as soon as racism is over, all the debts paid back and all the socialization by media and culture undone, then policy should revert to colorblindness.  But there are strong reasons to suppose that, not only will this never be the case (because the means necessary to achieve it will never be politically possible), but it cannot be the case.  After all, as rational beings we automatically conceptualize and categorize; as biologically descended beings through a process of evolution, we are hard-wired groups and parcel out trust accordingly.  If this is the case, might it be right, either permissible or (more likely) even obligatory, to still establish some permanent and pervasive means of providing some small advantage to black people to counteract this disadvantage, even after all the discrete debts like reparations have been paid?

The demographic change of the country would of course make this worth evaluating again.  

*Although this is a good question that I am not certain on as a legal principle: should restitution for past crimes paid to the descendants of the crimes’ victims, now deceased, include compensation for pain and suffering in addition to being made whole again?  

Does this question conceive of payments for the purpose of restitution and for the purpose of pain and suffering as separate?  

What about payments to compensate what it took to be made whole again with regard to the harm of the original crime?  For this question, it seems that we shouldn’t conceive these separately since to be made whole again with regard to the original crime, one must endure the further burden of engaging the process to do so.

Discrimination vs. Boycott in Commerce

Commerce is the collective endeavor at collective survival; for that reason, it an important question whether people should be free to not do commerce with people they don’t want to.

If you were on a desert island with 5 or so other survivors of the plane crash that stranded you there, and one of those people was an anti-gay bigot or anti-black racist/white supremacist; is it ok to refuse to collaborate in survival with him?  It’s not actively harming him, it’s just choosing not to positively help someone because of their dislike and disrespect of you. 

If it is, but discrimination is not ok against anti-gay christians in commerce today, why this difference?  Could it be only for the same reason that regulation is now ok, there are no more commons left for natural appropriation?  

On the desert island then, would it make a difference how big or small the island was, so that independent survival is possible without collaboration with others?  

Isn’t this just a restatement of the condition of active harming the person vs just opting to not positively help him: if the island is too small such there is no unappropriated land left and so individual survival is not possible, then refusing to collaborate with him is actively harming him by excluding him from access to the means of survival?  But if there is enough island that there is enough resources for him to survive on his own, then not collaborating with him is not actively harming him but just declining to actively help him.    

Diversity and Discrimination: Under (Facially-)Neutral Rules? Of Participants' Identity vs. Content of Participation?

Pretty much everyone agrees that discrimination against participants in an activity or place or institution is wrong but the question about discrimination of participants' dissipation is more controversial.

On the one hand, discrimination against/of the content of participants' participation can just be a means intended to discriminate against participants without looking like that's what it's doing: for example, school dress code's that prohibit items that are typically used by African-Americans.

This is reflected in some legal ideas: "in its majestic equality, the law forbids both the poor and the rich to sleep under bridges" is a statement that a universally applied and facially neutral law can in fact be unjust in its effect on a particular group. 

Similarly, the constitutionally accepted idea that disparate treatment is not necessary for unjust discrimination, which can instead manifest in disparate outcomes from facially neutral treatment or regulation, reflects this as well.

So there are some reasons to think that non-discrimination/inclusion either can or must require nondiscrimination of the content of participants' participation. 

On the other hand, there are also reasons to think that discrimination by/of the content of participants' participation in a contested space/institution is fine, and is not unjust discrimination like that against participants' identities. 

This view is demonstrated in cases like, for one example of very very many, the discussion on versifying and inclusion in academic philosophy as playing out on Brian Leiter's blog and others who are discussing with him: while others hold that upholding in enforcing certain standards of philosophy and preferring certain styles (i.e. analytic) is wrongful discrimination that upholds the majority white western male character of academic philosophy, lighter and others argue that such discrimination of content is legitimate as discrimination of participants could never be.

On yet another hand, when considering the promotion of diversity, those who hold that discrimination of participants' participation in the contested spaces and the content thereof is illegitimate exclusion and wrongful discrimination only favor measures to deliberately increased adversity of participants and their identities rather than of the content of their participation at all. 

in more concrete terms, this means that while they support diverse city of all possible identity types, they do not support increasing ideological diversity (and ignore for now the possibility that ideology is not a choice but innate, immutable, and the result of brain biology), and often portray the idea of doing so as intentionally and deliberately including falsity and or wrong; for example, in this line of thought, taking measures intended to increase ideological/content diversity in biology and zoology and the communities that study them could arguably include the deliberate inclusion of creationists. 

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Apply Antonin Scalia's reasoning from the PGA (golf) discrimination case: is discriminating against the use of a golf cart discriminating against participants or (the nature of) their participation? Does requiring they admit the use of golf carts change just who is admitted into playing the game or does it change the game itself? What is golf and what is a game?

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(Below is pasted a lightly edited version of the above text:)

Pretty much everyone agrees that discrimination against participants in an activity or place or institution is wrong but the question about discrimination of participants' dissipation is more controversial.

On the one hand, discrimination against/of the content of participants' participation can just be a means intended to discriminate against participants without looking like that's what it's doing: for example, school dress code's that prohibit items that are typically used by African-Americans.

This is reflected in some legal ideas: "in its majestic equality, the law forbids both the poor and the rich to sleep under bridges" is a statement that a universally applied and facially neutral law can in fact be unjust in its effect on a particular group. 

Similarly, the constitutionally accepted idea that disparate treatment is not necessary for unjust discrimination, which can instead manifest in disparate outcomes from facially neutral treatment or regulation, reflects this as well.

So there are some reasons to think that non-discrimination/inclusion either can or must require nondiscrimination of the content of participants' participation. 

On the other hand, there are also reasons to think that discrimination by/of the content of participants' participation in a contested space/institution is fine, and is not unjust discrimination like that against participants' identities. 

This view is demonstrated in cases like, for one example of very very many, the discussion on diversifying and inclusion in academic philosophy as playing out on Brian Leiter's blog and others who are discussing with him: while others hold that upholding in enforcing certain standards of philosophy and preferring certain styles (i.e. analytic) is wrongful discrimination that upholds the majority white western male character of academic philosophy, Leiter and others argue that such discrimination of content is legitimate as discrimination of participants could never be.

On yet another hand, when considering the promotion of diversity, those who hold that discrimination of participants' participation in the contested spaces and the content thereof is illegitimate exclusion and wrongful discrimination only favor measures to deliberately increase diversity of participants and their identities rather than of the content of their participation at all. 

in more concrete terms, this means that while they support diversity of all possible identity types, they do not support increasing ideological diversity (and ignore for now the possibility that ideology is not a choice but innate, immutable, and the result of brain biology), and often portray the idea of doing so as intentionally and deliberately including falsity and or wrong; for example, in this line of thought, taking measures intended to increase ideological/content diversity in biology and zoology and the communities that study them could arguably include the deliberate inclusion of creationists. 

Freedom of Association and Contract and Discrimination and Boycotts

Nondiscrimination mandates, commerce, and religious liberty:

That church in the northwest that it was reported was being sanctioned for not marrying a gay couple

-turned out:

--it was a business, registered for profit and not as a church

and

--it married divorcees, Jews and Muslims, etc. even did a wedding for cats

--you can't treat differently based only on personal animus alone

Well why/what is the reason to all of that, above?

If there's going to be any discrimination at all, should it be on a sign so that everyone can see it as they enter, so that members of the discriminated group can avoid the experience of being rejected after spending time at the establishment/expend any opportunity costs, and so that allies can refuse to patronize them 

or is no sign better, perhaps so as to not throw one's opinion of inferiority/immorality in their face?

(This seems like an example of the internecine lefty dispute between those with a focus on rhetoric and symbolism and those with a focus on material conditions.)

So private discrimination in commerce is ok when it's in the form of a boycott.

That is even considered the case when what is being discriminated against is viewed as an immoral practice, homophobic discrimination.

So boycotting some people for their immoral behavior in boycotting homophobic discriminators is OK, but boycotting what is perceived to be immoral behavior in game marriages is not OK?

Of course I agree, but not without violating content neutrality.

So it's not exactly: "

Private/civil society action against discriminator's legitimate?

And public/government action/interference against discriminators not OK?

Actual reason for all of the civil rights act, including nondiscrimination mandates for public accommodations:

-both constitutionally and philosophically, regulating private property can be permissible because it can be justified for government interference to remedy harms caused by government interference in the first place. The effect of slavery and legal discrimination doesn't automatically stop immediately when equity is achieved in current policy; policy can have long-term effects. Hence, the federal government can legitimately interfere in the private market place of public accommodations, and "separate but equal" can never be truly equal because of persisting "badges of inferiority".

And as a means of achieving equality/non-discrimination in society, government intervention was necessary and actions of civil society could never fully achieve it.

The Becker argument, while commonly portrayed by free-market and Chicago types as an example of what made him endearing/endeared, that the free market will reward non-discrimination and punish discrimination as much as theories of racial superiority are wrong because it is arbitrarily restricting their supply of labor. It's supposed to be an example of what makes Becker cute and lovable because it demonstrates that the free market can solve discrimination, supporting

But of course this argument doesn't apply when the consumers want and will pay for that discrimination.

-Discrimination against experiences versus discrimination against persons

-only against formally/officially recognize protective classes? How do you discover a protected class?

Is withholding tax exempt status using government/public force/coercion?

I think ultimately the way to answer all these questions about what is and is not discrimination and or what is permissible of what is discussed here is: how much is your discrimination/unwillingness to transact a denial of the means of survival or a voluntary and justly free cessation/withdrawal of mutually beneficial cooperation: I don't want to harm you/stop you from working/deny you the means of survival, but I just don't want to help you get it.

add in between private discrimination at once home through open houses and open parties to public accommodations, and businesses.

Ideological Diversity and Discrimination Against Some Participants vs. Against Some Participation

Promoting ideological diversity to improve/increase the representation of conservatives, for instance, in academia and other fields is criticized as/can be portrayed as promoting inclusion of false/wrong views. It is diversity and discrimination and exclusion/inclusion of content, not participant identity type.

Those who support promoting diversity of/for identity type but oppose it for ideology can frame/attempts to define their view in support of one and an opposition to the other on this ground, content versus participants, to defend their distinction/position against charges of inconsistently/hypocrisy.

But that would mean that they need to only support diversity measures that operate through participants identity and not through content in all contexts/cases.

This would mean of course that they (cannot support diversity measures/need to find other grounds to support diversity measures that) attempt to improve diverse city by pushing the deliberate/calculated/designed inclusion of content, like supporting changing Academic philosophy rather than just newly-admitting previously excluded people to the existing, unaffected/unchanged activity, or by pushing the exclusion of certain content, like male sidewalk entitlement/aggression or "boys will be boys" language in the technology world.

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Diversity of content versus diversity of participants:

-measures to promote diversity can affect content in two ways: bringing about the deliberate/ad hoc inclusion of previously absent content (types), and bringing him about the deliberate cessation of (initially/originally) existing content for the reason that it is said to perpetuate exclusion/discrimination.

If you're going to assert that affecting content is justifiable for the sake of diversity/inclusion and may even be necessary to that end, you can't then oppose promoting ideological diversity on the grounds that it is diverse city of content rather than slash and not just diverse city of participants' (identities/identity types).

Diversifying the curriculum: representation and 'Cosmopolitan ideal'

If it's true that the protesters are wrong that they are only reading dead white dudes, and are instead of reading also Confucius and Lao Tzu, etc.:

Then I would think a few things:

-I would ask the protesters who think this if they have personally looked at every classes syllabus and or done a systematic analysis of all the syllabi/curricula in all the academic departments at the whole school?

-More fundamentally, I avoid remark that if they are reading authors who are not white men and not recognizing that, including on issues of poverty, like maybe William Julius Wilson and so not realizing that he's black--that they're reading a black scholar on poverty arguing against the neoclassical/individualist view--

maybe it's because he's writing on poverty, and in particular black poverty, and not on blackness or being black or from the perspective of being black (and or) such that it's only accessible to people with the same experience.

That would demonstrate that they only want to diversity of identity/participants and not of content.

It also shows that she not only wants the inclusion of/favor city of certain types of people, like certain racial and ethnic minority members, but ones who speak in a certain way and to scholarship and research and production is of a certain sore and on a certain topic and in a certain style.

Also, if they've been reading them the whole time without being aware of it, then it proves that the identity characteristics of the writers/scholars is a relevant/of peoples ideas are irrelevant.

...

http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/too-many-dead-white-dudes-seattle-u-students-protest-programs-curriculum/

Diversifying the Canon of Philosophy: Representation, 'Me Studies', & 'Cosmopolitan ideal'

http://induecourse.ca/the-problem-of-me-studies/

I do a better job of explaining this at DailyNous but also professor Yap points this out as well: http://digressionsnimpressions.typepad.com/digressionsimpressions/2015/06/guest-post-on-what-is-the-real-problem-of-me-studies.html

The problem is that any study is the study of someone’s experience. Since the history of philosophy has been dominated by white males then the history of philosophy is very much a question of white male experiences. This is less obvious because those experiences have been treated as universal. As to the specific question of calculus, yes, I suppose you would be studying white people when you study calculus since mathematics is just another way of interpreting and measuring the world.I guess it depends on whether you think mathematicals are real or not. Now, you aren’t exclusively studying white men since other cultural views were part of the formation of calculus such as the concept of the zero which has its origins in Arab thought.

This would mean then, continuing the analogy, that instead of teaching mathematics as is, you need to diversify and teach other kinds of math; participation vs content for discrimination/diversity.

Does this go so far as to require diversity/inclusion of the false?