Pretty much everyone agrees that discrimination against participants in an activity or place or institution is wrong but the question about discrimination of participants' dissipation is more controversial.
On the one hand, discrimination against/of the content of participants' participation can just be a means intended to discriminate against participants without looking like that's what it's doing: for example, school dress code's that prohibit items that are typically used by African-Americans.
This is reflected in some legal ideas: "in its majestic equality, the law forbids both the poor and the rich to sleep under bridges" is a statement that a universally applied and facially neutral law can in fact be unjust in its effect on a particular group.
Similarly, the constitutionally accepted idea that disparate treatment is not necessary for unjust discrimination, which can instead manifest in disparate outcomes from facially neutral treatment or regulation, reflects this as well.
So there are some reasons to think that non-discrimination/inclusion either can or must require nondiscrimination of the content of participants' participation.
On the other hand, there are also reasons to think that discrimination by/of the content of participants' participation in a contested space/institution is fine, and is not unjust discrimination like that against participants' identities.
This view is demonstrated in cases like, for one example of very very many, the discussion on versifying and inclusion in academic philosophy as playing out on Brian Leiter's blog and others who are discussing with him: while others hold that upholding in enforcing certain standards of philosophy and preferring certain styles (i.e. analytic) is wrongful discrimination that upholds the majority white western male character of academic philosophy, lighter and others argue that such discrimination of content is legitimate as discrimination of participants could never be.
On yet another hand, when considering the promotion of diversity, those who hold that discrimination of participants' participation in the contested spaces and the content thereof is illegitimate exclusion and wrongful discrimination only favor measures to deliberately increased adversity of participants and their identities rather than of the content of their participation at all.
in more concrete terms, this means that while they support diverse city of all possible identity types, they do not support increasing ideological diversity (and ignore for now the possibility that ideology is not a choice but innate, immutable, and the result of brain biology), and often portray the idea of doing so as intentionally and deliberately including falsity and or wrong; for example, in this line of thought, taking measures intended to increase ideological/content diversity in biology and zoology and the communities that study them could arguably include the deliberate inclusion of creationists.
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Apply Antonin Scalia's reasoning from the PGA (golf) discrimination case: is discriminating against the use of a golf cart discriminating against participants or (the nature of) their participation? Does requiring they admit the use of golf carts change just who is admitted into playing the game or does it change the game itself? What is golf and what is a game?
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(Below is pasted a lightly edited version of the above text:)
Pretty much everyone agrees that discrimination against participants in an activity or place or institution is wrong but the question about discrimination of participants' dissipation is more controversial.
On the one hand, discrimination against/of the content of participants' participation can just be a means intended to discriminate against participants without looking like that's what it's doing: for example, school dress code's that prohibit items that are typically used by African-Americans.
This is reflected in some legal ideas: "in its majestic equality, the law forbids both the poor and the rich to sleep under bridges" is a statement that a universally applied and facially neutral law can in fact be unjust in its effect on a particular group.
Similarly, the constitutionally accepted idea that disparate treatment is not necessary for unjust discrimination, which can instead manifest in disparate outcomes from facially neutral treatment or regulation, reflects this as well.
So there are some reasons to think that non-discrimination/inclusion either can or must require nondiscrimination of the content of participants' participation.
On the other hand, there are also reasons to think that discrimination by/of the content of participants' participation in a contested space/institution is fine, and is not unjust discrimination like that against participants' identities.
This view is demonstrated in cases like, for one example of very very many, the discussion on diversifying and inclusion in academic philosophy as playing out on Brian Leiter's blog and others who are discussing with him: while others hold that upholding in enforcing certain standards of philosophy and preferring certain styles (i.e. analytic) is wrongful discrimination that upholds the majority white western male character of academic philosophy, Leiter and others argue that such discrimination of content is legitimate as discrimination of participants could never be.
On yet another hand, when considering the promotion of diversity, those who hold that discrimination of participants' participation in the contested spaces and the content thereof is illegitimate exclusion and wrongful discrimination only favor measures to deliberately increase diversity of participants and their identities rather than of the content of their participation at all.
in more concrete terms, this means that while they support diversity of all possible identity types, they do not support increasing ideological diversity (and ignore for now the possibility that ideology is not a choice but innate, immutable, and the result of brain biology), and often portray the idea of doing so as intentionally and deliberately including falsity and or wrong; for example, in this line of thought, taking measures intended to increase ideological/content diversity in biology and zoology and the communities that study them could arguably include the deliberate inclusion of creationists.
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