As a general matter, it seems to me that you can't rationally oppose a policy at the federal level for deontological reasons, but support the same policy at the state level. In other words, you can't argue both that a certain policy unjustifiably violates people's rights when imposed upon an unwilling opponent by the federal government and that the same policy does not violate people's rights when imposed upon an unwilling opponent by a state government.
Sure, you can consistently oppose the federal version for consequentialistic reasons while supporting it at the state level. The best arguments for federalism and decentralization are that federalizing a policy can constrain all states to a cookie-cutter solution that does not work well in all states, and it inhibits the possibility of experimentation in individual states that could discover new, better solutions, that could better not just that state but all states that follow the first's lead.
But if you oppose a policy at the federal level for deontological reasons, because it violates someone's rights or somehow otherwise violates its duty, then it's pretty unlikely that it wouldn't violate someone's rights if enacted at the state level.
Some controversial policy that is unjust when implemented by a supportive, say two-thirds, majority over the objections of the remaining one-third does not somehow become just if the supportive majority, dissenting minority and affected whole were all to be much smaller while keeping the same proportions to one another. Surely the justice of a controversial policy depends (at least partially) on the proportions of support and dissent in the affected population, rather than on the overall size of that population.
A deontologist could oppose a policy at the federal level but support it at the state level on grounds that it violates the supposed social contract when implemented at one level but not the other. The social contract could hold that the implementation of certain kinds of policies are restricted to certain levels (international, federal, state, local). An international authority may legitimately stop a genocide but not enforce drug laws, for example. If some people view the social contract like any other contract (other than the fact that it requires mere tacit rather than explicit agreement rather), then a violation of some rule of the contract, however arbitrary, is still a violation.
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